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Viewing the results of [the U.S. guardianship over Indian
wards], it is difficult for me to speak dispassionately. I shall not
ask my colleagues to examine in detail a certain page of history
upon which no American may gaze with feeling ofpride. Suffice
it to say that it reveals an almost uninterrupted succession of
broken treaties and promises, and a record of the ruthless
spoliation of defenseless wards. With all the vigor at my
command I protest against allowing that shameful and inhuman
treatment to continue a day longer without doing all in my power
to put an end to it.1
If the Indians are exposed to any danger, there is none greater
2than the residence among them of unprincipled white men.
Indian3 preference is an important part of an overall regulatory scheme
enacted to foster self-governance among the tribes.4 Indian preference laws
give Native American candidates hiring priority for parts of the Department
* First-place winner, 2010-11 American Indian Law Review Writing Competition.
Freya Ray is a graduate of Seattle University School of Law, class of 2011. She was
Research and Technical Editor of the Law Review. The author would like to extend her
deep gratitude to Kurt Kruckeberg and Gretchen Hoag for their extensive editing work on
this comment.
1. 78 CONG. REc. 11,726 (1934) (statements of Rep. Edgar Howard on Wheeler-
Howard Act, also known as the Indian Reorganization Act).
2. H.R. REP. No. 23-474, at 98 (1834) (letter dated Feb. 10, 1834, from Indian
Commissioners to the Secretary of War), quoted in Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 542
n.11 (1974).
3. This comment will use "Indian" and "Native American" interchangeably. There is
controversy about which term is preferred, although "Indian" seems to be preferred by
members of the group when a specific tribal name cannot be used. See, e.g., Lorraine
Bannai & Anne Enquist, (Un)Examined Assumptions and (Un)Intended Messages: Teaching
Students to Recognize Bias in Legal Analysis and Language, 27 SEATrLE U. L. REv. 1, 16-17
(2003).
4. 25 U.S.C. §§ 461-494a (2006).
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of the Interior (DOI) that provide services to Indians.5 The laws create two
main legal requirements. First, there must be separate job qualification
standards6 for Indians that take into account their unique cultural and
linguistic contributions.' Second, if there are multiple qualified candidates
for a position (whether there are two sets of qualification standards or only
one),8 hiring priority will be given to Indians.9
Questions about what sort of preference Indians should receive, 0 what
constitutes "hiring,"" which positions are subject to preference,' 2 and who
is an Indian within the meaning of the United States Code and federal
regulations have been the subject of much litigation. 3 But the basic goals
of Indian preference laws are clear: "to give Indians a greater participation
in their own self-government; to further the Government's trust obligation
toward the Indian tribes; and to reduce the negative effect of having non-
Indians administer matters that affect Indian tribal life."' 4 These are still
worthy purposes today. But Indian preference is in jeopardy.
This comment proposes a two-pronged approach for preserving the self-
governance benefits of Indian preference. First, the preference laws should
base qualification methods on sovereign tribal affiliation rather than blood
quantum. Second, the Department of the Interior (DOI), through a rule-
5. Id. § 472.
6. In hiring, the federal government sets standardized requirements for each position.
See, e.g., Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 94-454, 92 Stat. 1111 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C.); 5 C.F.R. § 300.103 (2010). These generic civil
service qualification standards do not take into account unique Indian qualifications such as
language skills or cultural familiarity, and high education requirements can introduce
barriers to qualification.
7. See, e.g., Dionne v. Shalala, 209 F.3d 705, 710 (8th Cir. 2000) (Lay, J., dissenting).
8. For some technical positions (e.g., medical professionals), it may be inappropriate to
reduce the education requirements in favor of linguistic and cultural skills. In these cases,
even though the position is subject to Indian preference, it may have just one set of
qualification standards. Indian applicants meeting this set of standards would be hired
before non-Indian applicants. Administrative positions, or positions that have direct contact
with Native American populations, on the other hand, would obviously benefit from
linguistic and cultural skills, and would have two sets of qualification criteria.
9. See, e.g., Prunierv. Norton, 468 F. Supp. 2d 1344, 1351 (D.N.M. 2006).
10. See generally Johnson v. Shalala, 35 F.3d 402 (9th Cir. 1994).
11. See generally Freeman v. Morton, 499 F.2d 494 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
12. See generally Dionne v. Shalala, 209 F.3d 705 (8th Cir. 2000).
13. See generally Margo S. Brownell, Who Is an Indian? Searching for an Answer to
the Question at the Core of Federal Indian Law, 34 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 275 (2001);
Nicole J. Laughlin, Identity Crisis: An Examination of Federal Infringement on Tribal
Autonomy to Determine Membership, 30 HAMLINE L. REv. 97 (2007).




making, or Congress, through amending legislation, should clarify the
requirements for determining which governmental positions are subject to
Indian preference. A clear legislative mandate by Congress would make it
more difficult for the DOI to circumvent Indian preference guidelines or to
defend in court hiring practices that fail to respect Indian preference.
In Part II, this comment provides the historical rationale for creating
Indian preference provisions, and addresses reasons for preserving Indian
preference. First, the policy of promoting self-governance is just as strong
today as it was in 1934 when Congress passed the Indian Reorganization
Act." The tribes are still sovereign nations with unique issues distinct from
other U.S. populations.16  Second, the statutory language,17 congressional
intent,'8 and the DOI's long-standing interpretation' 9 support a broader
definition of positions qualifying for Indian preference than that found in
the most recent interpretation adopted by the DOI and its sub-agencieS20 or
the D.C. District Court.2' Third, because of the unique guardian-ward
relationship between the federal government and the Indian tribes, canons
of construction were created, requiring the resolution of statutory
ambiguities in favor of the Indians.22
In Part III, this comment examines four ways in which Indian preference
laws are threatened. First, a recent court decision changed which positions
are subject to preference,23 and may have the effect of drastically limiting
both the quantity and quality of Indian preference positions, potentially
confining them only to low-level positions and excluding entirely positions
15. 25 U.S.C. §§ 461-494a (2006). The Indian Reorganization Act is also known as the
Wheeler-Howard Act. Katheleen R. Guzman, Give or Take an Acre: Property Norms and
the Indian Land Consolidation Act, 85 IOWA L. REv. 595, 606 n.50 (2000). The Act was
designed to "terminate[] allotment policy and procedure," which was "the ultimate
hegemony of Western European values." Id. at 603-06.
16. See, e.g., Chris K. lijima, Race Over Rice: Binary Analytical Boxes and a Twenty-
First Century Endorsement of Nineteenth Century Imperialism in Rice v. Cayetano, 53
RUTGERS L. REv. 91, 99 (2000) (detailing how majoritarian perspectives and racial norms
affect the native Hawaiian people).
17. 25 U.S.C. § 472.
18. See, e.g., 78 CONG. REC. 11,731 (1934) (statements by Rep. Howard).
19. See, e.g., Albuquerque Indian Rights v. Lujan, 930 F.2d 49, 51 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
20. See, e.g., id.
21. See, e.g., Indian Educators Fed'n Local 4524 v. Kempthome, Civil No. 04-01215
(TFH), slip op. at 2 (D.D.C. Dec. 12, 2008) (Amended Final Order and Declaratory
Judgment), available at http://64.38.12.138/docs/preference/orderl21208.pdf
22. See, e.g., Haley v. Seaton, 281 F.2d 620, 623 (D.C. Cir. 1960).
23. Indian Educators Fed'n Local 4524 v. Kempthorne, Civil No. 04-01215 (TFH), slip
op. at 2.
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of authority. Second, despite legal requirements, the government agencies
do not follow Indian preference requirements in practice.24 Third, there
may be no viable means to enforce Indian preference requirements when
the agencies do not follow them.25 Fourth, Indian preference laws present
constitutional concerns because they contain a racial component.26 The
rationale for allowing Indian preference despite the aforementioned racial
component is that the preference is based on sovereign tribal affiliation
rather than race,27 although race is used as one method of defining "Indian"
status. 28
In Part IV, this comment proposes two main avenues through which to
save Indian preference and foster tribal self-governance. First, race should
be removed from the definition of "Indian" for purposes of Indian
preference, with the focus shifted to tribal affiliation. Second, the DOI or
Congress should clarify precisely which positions are subject to preference.
This comment concludes in Part V.
II. Background: Why Indian Preference Should Be Saved
A. The Policy ofPromoting Self-Governance Is Still Valid
Indian preference was created as part of an overall scheme to give
Indians greater control in the management of their own affairs.2 9 "Indian
preference .. . recognizes that Indians doing for Indians is consistent with a
humane and civilized policy that will strengthen the tribes' right to exist
into perpetuity."3 o In 1934, Congress passed the Indian Reorganization Act
(IRA), also known as the Wheeler-Howard Act.1 John Collier, the
Commissioner for Indian Affairs, submitted a memo explaining the
rationale behind the Act:
24. See, e.g., Letter from Carolyn Cohen, Dir. of Office of Pers. Policy, Dep't of the
Interior Office of the Sec'y, to Aurene M. Martin, Acting Assistant Sec'y for Indian Affairs
(July 22, 2003) (on file with author).
25. See, e.g., Beams v. Norton, 327 F. Supp. 2d 1323, 1329 (D. Kan. 2004).
26. E.g., 25 C.F.R. § 5.1 (2010).
27. Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 554 (1974).
28. E.g., 25 C.F.R. § 5.1 (2010).
29. 25 U.S.C. § 461 (2006).
30. Harold A. Monteau, Monteau: Is Indian Preference Dead?, CALIFORNIA TRIBAL
BUSINESS ALLIANCE (Feb. 19, 2010), http://www.caltba.org/news/monteau-is-indian-prefer
ence-dead.
31. Indian Reorganization Act, ch. 576, 48 Stat. 984 (1934) (codified as amended at 25




The result [of present civil service rules] has been that the
Indians have been given no opportunity to handle their own
affairs or to be trained in their own affairs. This bill, we think,
gives them the opportunity to which they are entitled ... to make
the Indians the principal agents in their own economic and racial
salvation and . . . progressively reduce and largely decentralize
the powers of the Federal Indian Service.32
Nearly 80 years have elapsed since the IRA's passage, and tribes still
face many problems caused by government agency actions. In Cobell v.
Salazar,33 the DOI mismanaged individual Indian trust funds to the extent
that a government accounting was impossible, and resolution of the case
took 14 years.34 Millions of dollars of tribal trust funds may be missing.3 s
Moreover, Native American students, whose education is overseen by the
Bureau of Indian Education either directly or through grants, have the
lowest level of academic attainment of any racial group in the United
States.36 Between 2005 and 2008, only 30 percent of Bureau of Indian
Education schools attained the Adequate Yearly Progress goals set by their
state.3 ' These and many other tribal issues are subject to federal regulation
and control.
Obviously there are counterarguments to be made. What proof is there
that greater self-governance will solve these problems? Why do these
problems persist to this degree when Indian preference laws have been in
place for most of a century? The conquest of one people by another and the
resulting systematic, long-term oppression creates many challenges: racial,
social, economic, and scientific. Examining affirmative action studies is
32. Freeman v. Morton, 499 F.2d 494, 499 n.1 1 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (quoting Hearing on S.
2755 Before the S. Comm. on Indian Affairs, 73d Cong. 1, 19 (1934) (Memorandum by John
Collier, Comm'r for Indian Affairs)).
33. 573 F.3d 808 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
34. Id. at 813.
35. See id. at 810. For an in-depth discussion of the Cobell dispute, see Jered T.
Davidson, Comment, This Land Is Your Land, This Land Is My Land? Why the Cobell
Settlement Will Not Resolve Indian Land Fractionation, 35 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 575 (2010-
2011).
36. Nat'l Indian Edue. Ass'n, National Native Education Agenda: A Transition Paper
for the Department of Interior, NAT'L INDIAN EDUC. Ass'N 1 (2008), http://otrans.3cdn.
net/948ee4e335b7fe460c iam6bqur2.pdf ("American Indians have the lowest level of
educational attainment of any racial or ethnic group in the United States. The national
graduation rate for American Indian high school students was 49.3 percent in the 2003-04
school year, compared to 76.2 percent for white students.").
37. Id. at 2.
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instructive because one sees that different societal contexts require different
approaches and conclusions for ameliorative programs to be successful.38
The time needed for change and study on the effectiveness of adopted
programs complicates the landscape further: "[a] 'temporary' program to
eliminate a centuries-old condition is almost a contradiction in terms." 9 To
date, Indian preference has not received the consistent, long-term support 4o
necessary for it to prove itself a success. It should, at the very least, enjoy a
period of consistent interpretation and application before being abandoned
as a failure.
Educating one's children and managing a nation's funds are fundamental
matters. With so many pressing concerns before the tribes, the policy of
promoting self-governance is just as vitally important today as it was in
1934. The nation we are becoming and aspire to be values diversity and
self-governance over assimilation,4 ' as evidenced by President Obama's
38. See generally, THOMAS SOWELL, AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AROUND THE WORLD: AN
EMPIRICAL STUDY (2004) (presenting affirmative action studies from around the world).
39. Id. at 6.
40. Equal opportunities for education are just one such source of support that has been
lacking for Indians.
Today, after a two-hundred-year legacy of federally controlled subsidized
education, Indians have a miniscule professional class who are responsible for a
mineral resource contract, can build a bridge, can deliver babies, or can run a
cottage industry. The politically motivated system did its job well - most
Indians have the skills sufficient for manual labor, and only manual labor.
DELORES J. HUFF, To LIVE HEROICALLY: INSTITUTIONAL RACISM AND AMERICAN INDIAN
EDUCATION XV (1997). "Generations of Indians have been educated into a subservient
mentality, believing in white technological superiority rather than themselves." Id. at XIX.
41. The text of the Dawes Act makes it clear that U.S. citizenship was contingent on
leaving the tribe and assimilating with the individual land-owning culture:
[E]very Indian born within the territorial limits of the United States to whom
allotments shall have been made under the provisions of this act, or under any
law or treaty, and every Indian born within the territorial limits of the United
States who has voluntarily taken up, within said limits, his residence separate
and apart from any tribe of Indians therein, and has adopted the habits of
civilized life, is hereby declared to be a citizen of the United States, and is
entitled to all the rights, privileges, and immunities of such citizens, whether
said Indian has been or not, by birth or otherwise, a member of any tribe of
Indians within the territorial limits of the United States without in any manner
affecting the right of any such Indian to tribal or other property.
General Allotment Act of 1887 (Dawes Act) § 6, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388, 390 (1887) (codified
as amended at 25 U.S.C. § 349 (2006)). See generally Rose Stremlau, "To Domesticate and
Civilize Wild Indians ": Allotment and the Campaign to Reform Indian Families, 1875-1887,
30 J. FAM. HIST. 265 (2005). Federal Indian policy has vacillated throughout history,
shifting from allotment and assimilation, to Indian reorganization, to the current era of self-




formation of interfaith councils; 42 appointment of Muslims, 4 3 Hispanics,4
and Native AmericanS45 to influential positions; and even diverse religious
practices in the White House. 6 Supporting Indian preference is in line with
these policies.
B. Plain Language, Congressional Intent, and the DOI's Longstanding
Practice Support a Broad Definition of "Indian Office"
The current Indian preference statute uses the phrase "Indian Office."
The plain language of the Indian preference statute supports a broad
definition of "Indian Office" and, therefore, a greater number of positions.47
Title 25 U.S.C. § 472, the section dealing with Indians, states:
Indian land claims, see Patrick W. Wandres, Note, Indian Land Claims: Sherrill and the
Impending Legacy of the Doctrine ofLaches, 31 AM. INDLAN L. REv. 131 (2006-2007).
42. E.g., Press Release, Mara Vanderslice, Deputy Dir., White House Office of Faith
Based and Neighborhood P'ships, A New Era of Partnerships: Advisory Council on Faith-
based and Neighborhood Partnerships Presents Final Report of Recommendations (Mar. 11,
2010), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2010/03/11/a-new-era-partnerships-
advisory-council-faith-based-and-neighborhood-partnerships-pr ("This first-of-its-kind White
House advisory group made up of diverse religious and community non-profit leaders . . . .").
43. E.g., Press Release, White House, Muslim Americans Serving in the U.S.
Government (June 3, 2009), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/video/Muslim-Amer
icans-Serving-in-the-US-Govemment ("The United States government reflects the rich
diversity of the American population. Meet three Muslim Americans who freely retain and
express their own faith identities while serving their nation.").
44. E.g., Thomas Ferraro, Senate Confirms Sotomoayor, First Hispanic on Supreme
Court, REUTERS (Aug. 6, 2009, 5:14 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE5755F
S20090806.
45. E.g., Katherine Ling, Senate Confirms 3 Nominees for DOE, 1 for Interior, N.Y.
TIMES (May 20, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/gwire/2009/05/20/20greenwire-senate-
confirms-3-nominees-for-doe-l-for-inter-19116.html (discussing how a Native American,
Larry EchoHawk, was appointed head of the DOI).
46. See, e.g., 'There's Freedom to Be Won Everywhere', THE JERUSALEM PosT (Mar.
31, 2010), http://www.jpost.com/Home/Article.aspx?id=172113 (describing Obama's 2010
Seder, Obama having now held the first and second Seders in the history of the White
House).
47. The scope of this comment is limited to federal Indian preference inside the DOI.
The DOI is a Cabinet-level agency currently headed by Secretary of the Interior Ken
Salazar. The BIA, one of five main sub-departments of the DOI, is currently headed by
Assistant Secretary of Indian Affairs, Larry EchoHawk. The Office of the Assistant
Secretary for Indian Affairs (AS-IA) is EchoHawk's office, which controls the BIA and
many other agencies (including those for Indian trusts and gaming), but is not technically a
part of it. The Office of the Special Trustee for American Indians (OST) is a part of the DOI
reporting to Salazar but outside the BIA. Interior Organizational Chart, U.S. DEP'T OF THE
INTERIOR, http://doi.gov/whoweare/orgchart.cfin (last visited Apr. 23, 2012); Assistant
229No. 1]
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The Secretary of the Interior is directed to establish standards of
health, age, character, experience, knowledge, and ability for
Indians who may be appointed, without regard to civil-service
laws,48 to the various positions maintained, now or hereafter, by
the Indian Office, in the administration of functions or services
affecting any Indian tribe. Such qualified Indians shall hereafter
have the preference to appointment to vacancies in any such
positions.4 9
Section 472a is entitled "Indian preference laws applicable to Bureau of
Indian Affairs and Indian Health Service positions,"so which some argue
implies a more narrow construction, confining Indian preference to just the
positions inside those two agencies. But this section also provides that:
[t]he term "Bureau of Indian Affairs" means (A) the Bureau of
Indian Affairs and (B) all other organizational units in the
Department of the Interior directly and primarily related to
providing services to Indians and in which positions are filled in
accordance with the Indian preference laws."
The courts have relied upon this definition in concluding that preference is
to be applied broadly, including in the Office of the Special Trustee for
American Indians (OST) and the Office of the Assistant Secretary for
Indian Affairs (AS-IA).52
In addition, for many years, the DOI used the same interpretation of 25
U.S.C. § 472 as the courts. In Albuquerque Indian Rights v. Lujan, the
court stated that the DOI traditionally interpreted the term "Indian Office"
broadly to include all units within the DOI "directly and primarily related to
the providing of services to Indians," and did not limit application of the
Secretary - Indian Affairs: Biographical Statement of Larry Echo Hawk, U.S. DEP'T OF THE
INTERIOR, http://www.bia.gov/WhoWeAre/AS-IA/index.htm (last visited Apr. 23, 2012).
The Indian Health Service used to be part of the BIA, but was removed entirely and
relocated to within the Department of Health and Human Services. Indian Health Service
Introduction, INDIAN HEALTH SERVS., http://www.ihs.gov/index.cfin?module=ihslntro (last
visited Apr. 23, 2012). Traditionally, it was clear that Indian preference existed throughout
the BIA and Indian Health Service. The AS-IA and OST are disputed (for a full analysis,
see infra Part III.A). See Indian Educators Fed'n Local 4524 v. Kempthorne (Kempthorne
1), 541 F. Supp. 2d 257, 265-66 (D.D.C. 2008).
48. E.g., 5 C.F.R. § 300.103 (2010) (discussing civil service standards).
49. 25 U.S.C. § 472 (2006).
50. Id. § 472a.
51. Id. § 472a(e)(3).




preference solely to positions within the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA).
The DOI abruptly changed its position in 1988, issuing a memo stating that
preference applies only to the BIA and departments removed intact from
within the BIA. 54  As discussed in detail in a later section of this
comment,55 the DOI failed to hold a rulemaking to support this change in
interpretation, and the court found the change arbitrary.56
In passing § 472, Congress's intent was to create an Indian Office staffed
primarily by Indians. Congress planned gradually to change the
demographics of the office to include not simply entry-level jobs, but also
higher-level positions. A congressional record statement elucidated
Congress's intent: "This does not mean a radical transformation overnight
or the ousting of present white employees. It does mean a preference right
to qualified Indians for appointments to future vacancies in the local Indian
field service and an opportunity to rise to the higher administrative and
technical posts."5 7
Since the original passage of the IRA, Congress has amended § 472 in
response to court decisions. In 1970, a court held that preference did not
apply to reductions in force, only to vacancies. In 1979, Congress
responded by amending the statute specifically to provide protections to
reductions in force.59 In 1974, a court held that preference applied to lateral
transfers, even when a non-Indian employee was being transferred away
from one posting for safety reasons.60 Congress again responded by
including in the 1979 amendments provisions allowing lateral or downward
transfers for the protection of the employee or his family, or when the
employee is no longer able to serve the local tribe. If Congress objected
to the courts' holdings that Indian preference applies to positions outside
the BIA and Indian Health Service, it has had ample opportunity since 1991
to amend the statute to change its meaning. But it has not done so, leading
to an implication that it endorses a broad definition of "Indian Office" - one
53. Albuquerque Indian Rights v. Lujan, 930 F.2d 49, 51 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
54. Id. (citation omitted). "Departments removed intact" generally refers to the Indian
Health Service. Id.
55. See infra Part III.A.
56. Kempthorne I, 541 F. Supp. 2d at 266.
57. 78 CONG. REc. 11,731 (1934) (statement of Rep. Howard).
58. Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Hickel, 432 F.2d 956, 961 (10th Cir. 1970).
59. Act of Dec. 5, 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-135, § 2(a), 93 Stat. 1056, 1057 (1979)
(codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. § 472a(a) (2006)).
60. Freeman v. Morton, 499 F.2d 494, 498 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
61. §2(b)(1)(A), (C), 93 Stat. at 1057 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §
472a(b)(1)(A), (C)).
No. 1] 231
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that could include positions within other departments of the DOI that
provide services to Indians.
C. The Canons of Construction and Guardian-Ward Relationship Support
an Inclusive Definition
There are special canons of construction for courts to use when
examining issues relating to Indian tribes.62 In 1912, the Supreme Court
stated that Indian issues require liberal statutory construction to protect a
"weak and defenseless" people, and that this then-unwritten rule had been
in place for more than a hundred years.6 ' By 1960, the language had
become slightly less condescending, but still affirmed the same basic idea:
"avowed solicitude for welfare of [] Indian wards" requires liberal
construction of statutes and rules of law relating to Indian matters, with
ambiguities resolved in favor of the Indians."
In Choctaw Nation v. Oklahoma,6 5 a 1970 Supreme Court case dealing
specifically with treaties, the Court's language about lack of consent is
illuminating:
[T]reaties were imposed upon them and they had no choice but
to consent. As a consequence, this Court has often held that
treaties with the Indians must be interpreted as they would have
understood them . . . and any doubtful expressions in them
should be resolved in the Indians' favor.66
Federal statutes, federal court decisions, and DOI rulemakings are similarly
imposed without meaningful consent, despite the canon of construction
requiring liberal interpretation of ambiguities in favor of the Indians.
Although it appears that the Indian preference statute clearly refers to all
positions within the DOI that provide services to Indians, should a court
62. These special rules arise from the conquest of the tribes:
In the exercise of the war and treaty powers, the United States overcame the
Indians and took possession of their lands, sometimes by force, leaving them an
uneducated, helpless and dependent people, needing protection against the
selfishness of others and their own improvidence. Of necessity the United
States assumed the duty of furnishing that protection, and with it the authority
to do all that was required to perform that obligation and to prepare the Indians
to take their place as independent, qualified members of the modem body
politic.
Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs v. Seber, 318 U.S. 705, 715 (1943).
63. Choate v. Trapp, 224 U.S. 665, 675 (1912).
64. Haley v. Seaton, 281 F.2d 620, 623 (D.C. Cir. 1960).
65. 397 U.S. 620 (1970).




find any ambiguity with respect to which positions are subject to
preference, the canons of construction require that the ambiguity be
resolved in favor of the Indians seeking the employment preference.
III. How Indian Preference Is in Jeopardy
Indian preference is an important part of an overall regulatory scheme
enacted to foster self-governance among the Indian tribes.6 1 While it
enjoyed strong support from Congress and the courts for many years, it is
currently threatened in four ways: (1) courts have limited the positions
qualifying for preference, 8 (2) the DOI does not follow the existing court
holdings or statutory preference requirements,6 9 (3) effective enforcement is
near impossible, 70 and (4) the use of blood-based definitions for "Indian"
creates constitutional conflicts. 7'
A. Indian Educators Federation v. Kempthorne Changed the Definition of
Positions Subject to Preference, Dangerously Narrowing its Scope
One of the ways to expand and contract Indian preference in practice is
to change the interpretation of which positions are subject to preference.
Historically, the dominant interpretation has been that, when an agency
office or department7 2 is subject to preference, all positions in that
department are subject to preference.7 3 Recent litigation74 has drastically
constricted this interpretation.
67. 25 U.S.C. § 461 (2006).
68. See, e.g., Indian Educators Fed'n Local 4524 v. Kempthome, Civil No. 04-01215
(TFH), slip op. at 2 (D.D.C. Dec. 12, 2008) (Amended Final Order and Declaratory
Judgment), available at http://64.38.12.138/docs/preference/orderl21208.pdf
69. See, e.g., Memorandum from Acting Dir., Office of Human Res. Policy, Dep't of
the Interior Office of the Sec'y, to Human Res. Dirs. (Sept. 4, 2003) (on file with author)
[hereinafter Memorandum from Acting Dir.].
70. See, e.g., Beams v. Norton, 327 F. Supp. 2d 1323, 1329 (D. Kan. 2004), affd, 141 F.
App'x. 769 (10th Cir. 2005).
71. See, e.g., Paul Spruhan, Indian as Race /Indian as Political Status: Implementation
of the Half-Blood Requirement Under the Indian Reorganization Act, 1934-1945, 8 RUTGERS
RACE & L. REv. 27 (2006) [hereinafter Spruhan, Indian as Race / Indian as Political Status].
72. For an overview of the departments at issue, see Interior Organizational Chart,
supra note 47.
73. See, e.g., 25 C.F.R. § 5.1 (2010) ("For purposes of making appointments to
vacancies in all positions in the Bureau of Indian Affairs a preference will be extended to
persons of Indian descent . . . ."); 25 C.F.R. § 5.2(a) (2010) ("Preference will be afforded a
person meeting any one of the standards of § 5.1 whether the appointment involves initial
hiring, reinstatement, transfer, reassignment or promotion.").
74. See generally Kempthorne I, 541 F. Supp. 2d 257 (D.D.C. 2008).
No. 1]) 233
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In 2008, the Indian Educators Federation Local 4524 of the American
Federation of Teachers" filed suit 6 in the D.C. District Court, seeking a
declaration that Indian preference applied to some disputed DOI positions.77
The scope of the term "Indian Office" was central to the dispute. The
statute that created Indian preference requires that the Secretary of the
Interior establish standards "for Indians who may be appointed, without
regard to civil-service laws, to the various positions maintained, now or
hereafter, by the Indian Office, in the administration of functions or services
affecting any Indian tribe."7 The outcome appeared to favor the Indian
plaintiffs.79 The court entered a declaratory judgment stating that Indian
preference encompassed not only positions within the BIA and departments
removed intact from within the BIA, but also other departments within the
DOI that directly and primarily provide services to Indians.80 This includes
the OST and the AS-IA. 8 ' This holding expanded the number of potentially
eligible positions in the OST from the 170 that the Secretary had deemed
eligible to 550, the total number of positions in the OST.82
The D.C. District Court's adoption of the DOI's suggested definition for
determining which positions qualify for preference overshadowed this
limited favorable outcome for the union. The court ultimately declared
that "the employment preference for American Indians . . . applies to all
positions in the [OST and AS-IA] that primarily and directly relate to the
provision of services to Indians."8
Prior to the court's declaration, all positions within any department
deemed to be part of the Indian Office were subject to preference. Even if
it was determined that the position had particular technical requirements
that rendered separate qualification standards inappropriate, the courts
interpreted the law as requiring the Secretary to make an individual
determination for that position in order to lawfully apply the general civil
75. The Indian Educators Federation Local 4524 of the American Federation of
Teachers is a union representing Indian employees of the OST and the BIA. Id. at 258-59.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. 25 U.S.C. § 472 (2006) (emphasis added).
79. Kempthorne I, 541 F. Supp. 2d at 267.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 263-65.
82. Complaint at 5, Indian Educators Fed'n Local 4524 v. Kempthome, 541 F. Supp. 2d
257 (Civil No. 04-01215 (TFH)).
83. Amended Final Order and Declaratory Judgment, supra note 21, at 2.
84. Id.




service standard rather than a separate qualifications standard for Indian
applicants. But the court's holding in this case is a significant departure
from the previous rule because the preference requirement is on a position-
by-position basis, rather than by department.
The Secretary of the Interior advocated that the application of Indian
preference should be "only to the positions in those offices that primarily
and directly provide services to Indians."88 As the Secretary had previously
contended that there were no such positions within the OST or the AS-IA,
this definition would severely limit the effectiveness of the declaratory
judgment granted to the union. The union argued that this definition would
not only deny application to the offices in contention in the suit, but would
also allow the Secretary "to strip Indian preference from many positions in
the Bureau of Indian Affairs."90 By restricting preference to positions that
provide services, rather than applying it to all positions in a department that
provides services, Indian preference is drastically limited.
Further, the definition allows the agency to determine on a case-by-case
basis whether individual positions are subject to preference. Courts have
held that the decision by the DOI about which positions are subject to
preference is not a matter of discretion,9' making the D.C. Circuit court's
recent order a significant precedential departure. Logically, positions that
directly provide services to Indians will be lower-level positions in the
organization. Higher-level positions with more policy-setting power are not
directly providing services, and the agency can easily strip them of their
preference classifications. If the DOI takes advantage of this holding to the
86. Dionne v. Shalala, 209 F.3d 705, 707, 710 (8th Cir. 2000).
87. Kempthorne I, 541 F. Supp. 2d at 265.
88. Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendant's Motion for Entry of Final
Judgment at 9, Indian Educators Fed'n Local 4524 v. Kempthorne, 541 F. Supp. 2d 257
(Civil No. 04-01215 (TFH)).
89. Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendant's Motion to Dismiss or, in the
Alternative, for Summary Judgment at 27-28, 48, Indian Educators Fed'n Local 4524 v.
Kempthorne, 541 F. Supp. 2d 257 (Civil No. 04-01215 (TFH)) ("[R]ather than providing
direct services to Indians or allowing Indians to govern themselves in the manner
encouraged by the 1934 legislation, the focus of the OST is on helping the federal
government fulfill responsibilities left over from the days of the allotment policy. The
mission of the Office of the Assistant Secretary for Indian Affairs is, likewise, broad and
national, rather than primarily local and service oriented.").
90. Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Plaintiffs Motion for
Permanent Injunction and in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Entry of Final Judgment
at 1, Indian Educators Fed'n Local 4524 v. Kempthorne, 541 F. Supp. 2d 257 (Civil No. 04-
01215 (TFH)).
91. See, e.g., Freeman v. Morton, 499 F.2d 494, 502 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
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full extent possible, it will lead to abuse and ongoing litigation, and will
place Indian preference as originally conceived in serious jeopardy.
B. Using Civil Service Definitions in Practice
While a full empirical study is outside the scope of this comment, the
BIA and DOI do not consistently conform to the legal requirements for
application of Indian preference laws. A DOI memo from July 2003
authorized the use of general civil service requirements92 as job
qualification standards within the BIA:
Subject: Qualification Standards for Application in the Bureau of
Indian Affairs ...
Your request to establish Office of Personnel Management
(OPM) job qualification standards as the Bureau of Indian
Affairs standards for all General Schedule; Trades and Labor;
and Senior Executive Service positions, as described in your
memorandum, is hereby approved. 9 3
In response, the Acting Director of Human Resources Policy sent an
instruction letter to all Human Resources Directors inside the DOI:
Subject: Qualification Standards for Application in the Bureau of
Indian Affairs
The Attachment to this Memorandum gives approval to the
Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) to establish all Office of
Personnel Management's (OPM's) job qualification standards as
the BIA's excepted standards for all General Schedule and
Trades and Labor occupations. The OPM standards will be used
to qualify all individuals, including those entitled to Indian
Preference, applying for positions within the Bureau.
Additionally, the Department approved BIA's adoption of
OPM's Senior Executive Service (SES) qualifications criteria for
filling SES positions. To account for the uniqueness of some
positions within the BIA, use quality ranking factors and
selective factors relating to American Indian/Alaska Native
language and/or culture, when appropriate ....
92. See supra note 6 (giving an overview of the civil service qualification standards).
93. Memorandum from Carolyn Cohen, Dir. of Office of Pers. Policy, Dep't of the
Interior Office of the Sec'y, to Aurene M. Martin, Acting Assistant Sec'y for Indian Affairs




Use of the OPM standards and SES criteria for all BIA vacancies
begins the date of this Memorandum. All previously issued BIA
excepted standards are obsolete. 94
The memo leaves entirely to the discretion of agency human resource
directors whether a particular position should take any notice of "selective
factors" related to Indian status.95 While this memo was issued in 2003 and
does not prove the current state of agency actions with regard to individual
jobs, this directive, given to all Human Resources Directors, was in direct
opposition to settled law at that time.96
There are three legal questions presented by this hiring policy. First,
which positions are automatically subject to preference? Second, who is
authorized to make decisions about exceptions to the general rule? Third,
may general civil service standards be used in hiring for a position?
First, in examining which positions are subject to Indian preference, as a
baseline, the IRA mandates that it includes all positions inside the BIA.97
Morton v. Mancari, the foundational Supreme Court case on Indian
preference, used this understanding as the starting point of further
analysis.98  The first sentence of the decision reads: "The Indian
Reorganization Act of 1934 . . . accords an employment preference for
"199
qualified Indians in the Bureau of Indian Affairs ....
From this basic understanding that Indian preference applied to all
positions inside the BIA, much litigation has ensued to clarify its
boundaries. In Freeman v. Morton, the Eighth Circuit addressed one of
those boundaries: the extent to which agency discretion is appropriate to
determine which positions are subject to preference.'o The dispute was
over whether preference applied to lateral transfers, in addition to hiring
and promotion.' 0' The court held that it did apply to lateral transfers, and
further, that the statute did not allow for agency discretion in the application
of Indian preference:
[T]he controlling statute does not say the "Indians ... may have
preference." It says: ". . . qualified Indians shall hereafter
94. Memorandum from Acting Dir., supra note 69.
95. Id.
96. E.g., Freeman, 499 F.2d at 502.
97. 25 U.S.C. §§ 472-472a (2006).
98. Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 537-38 (1974).
99. Id. at 537.
100. See generally Freeman, 499 F.2d 494.
101. Id. at 497.
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have. . . preference", and "if Congress had intended to write
discretionary power into the language of Sec. 472 it would have
done so expressly . . . One need only look at various Indian
preference statutes to recognize that Congress was well aware of
the distinction between discretionary and mandatory action."l 0 2
In 1979, Congress responded to this decision, amending the Indian
preference statute to exempt lateral transfers from Indian preference.10 3 The
exemptions were allowed when necessary to protect the health of the
employee, as part of a reduction in force, or when that employee's
relationship with the tribe deteriorated to the point that effective service
could no longer be given.'0 Congress again chose not to change the
language about discretion and, aside from the exemptions, the preference
remains mandatory.
Second, the DOI's policy letter raises issues about authorization to make
exceptions to the general rules. In 1979, Congress further specified that the
Secretary of the Interior, a Deputy Secretary, or an Assistant Secretary must
make the determination about when the three preference exceptions apply,
and may not delegate such power to any other person. 0 5 In enacting this
amendment, Congress made specific exceptions to the previous statute, and
the exceptions accord with the DOI's requested exceptions to the statutory
language in Freeman.'06  Congress's decision to amend for one specific
dangerous scenario 0 7 implies congressional ratification of the Eighth
Circuit's holding that, in general, Indian preference applies to all hiring and
promotion inside the BIA.'os
Third, the DOI's policy letter violates statutory and common law in its
blanket application of civil service standards. When Indian preference is
mandated for a position, the DOI must use two separate sets of job
qualification requirements: one to evaluate whether Indian candidates are
qualified and one to evaluate whether non-Indian candidates are
102. Id. at 501 (emphasis added).
103. 25 U.S.C. § 472a (2006).
104. Id. § 472a(b)(1).
105. Id. § 472a(b)(2).
106. Freeman, 499 F.2d at 498 ("[C]ircumstances dictating the transfer of a particular
non-Indian employee because of problems beyond his control or when his safety or
continued effectiveness is threatened . . . .").
107. Id. at 499 (noting that it is the legislature that is responsible for granting power to
the Secretary in emergency situations, such as that in Freeman).




qualified.'09 The Indian requirements include factors such as cultural
awareness and language skills, and may de-emphasize formal education."o
Typically, the non-Indian requirements are the general civil service
requirements for that position.' The statute is unambiguous,"l and the
Eighth and Ninth Circuits consistently state that separate job qualification
requirements must be formulated for all Indian preference positions."3
The DOI memo gives general approval to use civil service standards, at
the discretion of unnamed Human Resources Directors and presumably
their staff, for broad categories of positions within the BIA, with only
unique positions incorporating any Indian-specific job qualification
requirements.114 Even in recent years, the DOI does not appear to feel any
compulsion to conform its practices to the requirements of statutes or the
decisions of the courts.
C. Structural Bars to Effective Enforcement
When Indian preference law requirements are not upheld in practice,
enforcement options range from being limited and costly to nonexistent.
Legal and structural obstacles that bar litigation and enforcement exist
regardless of how clear the statute or how blatant the governmental
violation. There are no private monetary remedies, so only declaratory and
injunctive relief may be obtained. Appeals can only be made from final,
nondiscretionary agency actions. When courts hold that a violation has
occurred, they tend to remand back to the agency for review, rather than
take direct action. Finally, a detailed case study of the injunctive relief
109. Dionne v. Shalala, 209 F.3d 705, 707 (8th Cir. 2000).
110. Felix S. Cohen, The Erosion of Indian Rights, 1950-1953: A Case Study in
Bureaucracy, 62 YALE L.J. 348, 361-62 (1953).
111. Dionne, 209 F.3d at 706-07.
112. 25 U.S.C. § 472 (2006) ("The Secretary of the Interior is directed to establish
standards of health, age, character, experience, knowledge, and ability for Indians who may
be appointed, without regard to civil-service laws, to the various positions maintained, now
or hereafter, by the Indian Office . . . .").
113. See Dionne, 209 F.3d at 709 (inferring in dicta that Indians applying for positions
falling under the Indian Preference Act hiring standards are separate from the civil service
job requirements); Johnson v. Shalala, 35 F.3d 402, 406-07 (9th Cir. 1994) (applying
Preston); Preston v. Heckler, 734 F.2d 1359, 1371 (9th Cir. 1984) (declaring that separate
and independent qualification standards must be considered); Oglala Sioux Tribe of Indians
v. Andrus, 603 F.2d 707, 717 (8th Cir. 1979) (stating that the BIA cannot apply general civil
service rules to an Indian conflict of interest in an employment issue).
114. Memorandum from Acting Dir., supra note 69.
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aspects" 5 of Indian Educators Federation Local 4524 v. Kempthorne"6
will illustrate that permanent injunctions are extremely difficult to obtain.
The statute itself is silent as to whether courts can impose a private
monetary remedy if the DOI violates Indian preference laws.1 7  In the
absence of clear statutory language, courts determine whether a private
remedy exists. In the courts' analysis, congressional intent is the critical
factor." 8 Recent decisions in both the Ninth and Tenth Circuits found that
there was no congressional intent to create a private remedy for violations
of Indian preference statutes." 9 As the courts are currently construing the
law, individuals cannot bring suit for money damages.
While possible, it is difficult to bring a suit for declaratory or injunctive
relief in response to agency action. In 2004, the Secretary of the Interior
acknowledged that "[i]f there is any right to proceed with an individual
claim against an agency of the United States pursuant to the Indian
Preference Act, it must proceed as one for nonmonetary relief pursuant to
the Administrative Procedures Act,"' 20 meaning an appeal of a final,
115. See supra Part III.A (addressing the declaratory relief aspects of Indian Educators
Federation Local 4524 v. Kempthorne, specifically dealing with the definition of which
positions are subject to the preference).
116. Indian Educators Fed'n Local 4524 v. Kempthome (Kempthorne II), 590 F. Supp.
2d 15 (D.D.C. 2008).
117. 25 U.S.C. § 472 (2006).
118. Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 578 (1979) ("The ultimate question
is one of congressional intent, not one of whether this Court thinks that it can improve upon
the statutory scheme that Congress enacted into law.").
119. Beams v. Norton, 327 F. Supp. 2d 1323, 1329 (D. Kan. 2004); see also Solomon v.
Interior Reg'1 Hous. Auth., 313 F.3d 1194, 1195 (9th Cir. 2002). Interestingly, the Beams
court appears to misapply Solomon and uses the decision out of context, but that does not
mean that the overall holding would be any different in another court. The Beams decision
uses Solomon to support the Ninth Circuit's finding of no congressional intent to create a
private cause of action for disappointed Indian job applicants: "Congress intended to allow
Indian people and tribes greater freedom in self-governance at the tribal or community level,
not to confer individual rights on individual Indians." Beams, 327 F. Supp. 2d at 1329
(quoting Solomon, 313 F.3d at 1198). Although Beams relied upon Solomon as authority for
this proposition, this quote was analyzing the first factor (the class benefited), and was
immediately preceded, in Soloman, by a paragraph with the opposite inference, and a
conclusion that the first factor was in equipoise. Solomon, 313 F.3d at 1198 ("The very
nature of the benefit is an employment and training preference in favor of Indian applicants,
who are individuals by definition.").




nondiscretionaryl21 agency action. As a result, Indians seeking
retroactively to apply Indian preference to positions for which they were
not hired must first exhaust all agency appeals. Through litigation, the job
applicant will have limited potential relief: a declaratory judgment that the
position (already filled by another) should have been subject to preference,
or an injunction issued providing that when that position (already filled by
another) becomes vacant, preference must be applied in hiring. No remedy
exists to restore a lost employment opportunity.
The courts have refused to take a more active role in setting the
employment guidelines for Indian preference jobs, instead preferring to
remand cases to the agency that created the original problem.'12 In Heckler,
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals appeared deeply displeased with the
agency action conducted before appeal:
There are no facts supporting, and there is no substance to, any
of the Secretary's substantive arguments. To say that they are
frivolous would be an act of generosity. The district court was
correct in holding that, under section 10(e) of the Administrative
Procedure Act, it was a continuing abuse of discretion for the
Secretary to apply the generally applicable civil service
standards to Indians applying for positions in the Indian Health
Service. This abuse is one that has continued for decades - one
which the Secretary, like her predecessors, persists in refusing to
correct.124
Despite this strong language, the court's only option was remand to the
agency.12 5
Finally, a detailed case study of the injunctive relief aspects of Indian
Educators Federation v. Kempthorne will illustrate the staggering obstacles
facing potential plaintiffs. In 2008, the D.C. District Court denied a request
for a permanent injunction that would have forced the DOI to comply with
the current Indian preference laws, choosing instead to limit its action to a
121. As discussed in Part III.A., the D.C. Circuit Court may have introduced further
barriers to litigation in Indian Educators Federation Local 4524 v. Kempthorne. If the
courts may only grant appeals from final, nondiscretionary agency action, as the definition
of which jobs are subject to preference becomes more ambiguous, more decisions are subject
to unfettered agency discretion and many opportunities removed from corrective litigation.
122. Beams, 327 F. Supp. 2d at 1331.
123. See, e.g., Preston v. Schweiker, 555 F. Supp. 886, 892 (D. Alaska 1983), affd in
part, rev'd in part by Preston v. Heckler, 734 F.2d 1359 (9th Cir. 1984).
124. Heckler, 734 F.2d at 1373 (citation omitted).
125. Id.
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declaratory judgment about the definition of positions subject to
preference.126  Although Kempthorne I was filed in 2004, the same
fundamental issue was addressed in 1991 with a different group of Indian
plaintiffs.127 The history will illustrate why the final result in this case was
so shocking.
In Albuquerque Indian Rights v. Lujan, the D.C. Circuit was highly
critical of the manner in which the DOI had altered its interpretation of
Indian preference.128 The Albuquerque Indian Rights Association filed suit
in 1991 against the DOI for failing to extend Indian preference protections
to all positions within the DOIl2 9 that directly and primarily provided
services to Indians, including positions within the Office of Construction
Management.13 0 The DOI contended that Indian preference applied only to
positions inside the BIA and those departments removed intact'' from the
BIA.132 The DOI adopted this new stance in 1988 without a rulemaking
and in direct opposition to earlier agency interpretations.'
In general, an agency cannot deviate from its prior statutory
interpretation without some rational basis. "A statutory interpretation ...
that results from an unexplained departure from prior . . . policy and
practice is not a reasonable one." 34 An agency can change its view, but it
is obligated to explain its reasons for doing so by providing a "reasoned
analysis." 35 If a rulemaking is required, the agency must provide notice in
the Federal Register, accept written comment, and incorporate a concise
126. Kempthorne 1, 541 F. Supp. 2d 257, 267 (D.D.C. 2008) (declaratory judgment
issued); Kempthorne II, 590 F. Supp. 2d 15, 21 (D.D.C. 2008) (injunction denied).
127. See generally Albuquerque Indian Rights v. Lujan, 930 F.2d 49 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
128. See id. at 58-59.
129. For a detailed review of agency structures, see supra note 47.
130. Albuquerque Indian Rights, 930 F.2d at 50.
131. Generally, the language "departments removed intact" refers to the Indian Health
Service, which was relocated from the BIA to the U.S. Department of Health, Education and
Welfare (now known as the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services) in 1954. See,
e.g., C.L. Henson, From War to Self-Determination: A History of the Bureau of Indian
Affairs, AMERICAN STUDIES RESOURCE CENTER AT LJMU (May 25, 2011), http://www.
americansc.org.uk/Online/indians.htm.
132. Albuquerque Indian Rights, 930 F.2d at 51.
133. Id. at 52.
134. Northpoint Tech., Ltd. v. Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n, 412 F.3d 145, 156 (D.C. Cir.
2005).





general statement of the rule's basis and purpose.136 The DOI took none of
these steps.137
The suit ultimately failed for lack of standing, but the D.C. Circuit issued
a carefully worded caution in dicta.'38 The court suggested that, should
other plaintiffs come before them with justiciable claims, the agency might
lack a sufficient record to overcome a presumption of arbitrariness:
We certainly do not rule and do not intend to imply that the
Department cannot successfully defend its new interpretation.
We merely suggest that in order to prepare for doing so, should a
justiciable case arise, the Department might give serious
consideration to re-examining its interpretation in a forum
providing more due process, allowing more opportunity for input
from interested parties, and creating a more reviewable record,
rather than simply adopting an ex parte memorandum followed
by the posting of an employment notice.'3 9
Five years later, the DOI published a notice of a proposed rule, soliciting
comment.140 The rule proposed codifying the 1988 interpretation, which
would apply Indian preference only within the BIA and departments
removed intact from the BIA (for practical purposes, the BIA and the
Indian Health Service). The notice stated:
The legal position of the Department of the Interior on the scope
of the preference is set forth in a June 10, 1988, opinion by then-
solicitor Ralph Tarr, "The Scope of Indian Preference Under the
Indian Reorganization Act", M-36960, 96 I.D. 1. It concludes, in
general, that the preference is limited in application to the
Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) or units removed intact from the
Bureau of Indian Affairs to another Departmental bureau.141
The DOI never followed through with its own rule-making procedures,
and still has not published a final rule.14 2 As a result, the DOI was again
sued in the 2004 Indian Educators Federation v. Kempthorne case over the
136. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2006).
137. Albuquerque Indian Rights, 930 F.2d at 58-59.
138. Id. at 59.
139. Id.
140. Preference in Employment, 61 Fed. Reg. 36,671 (July 12, 1996) (to be codified at
25 C.F.R. §§ 5.1-5.6).
141. Id.
142. Kempthorne I, 541 F. Supp. 2d 257, 263, 265 n.5 (D.D.C. 2008) ("To date, no final
rule has been published.").
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same 1988 change in interpretation, with the same scanty agency record to
support its actions.143 This time, the plaintiffs represented Indians working
in the OST, the AS-IA, and all other positions in the DOI that directly and
primarily relate to providing services to Indians.'" The D.C. Circuit held
for the plaintiffs, and worded its displeasure with the DOI's actions much
more strongly:
Remarkably, the Interior Department attempted to re-examine its
interpretation in a forum providing due process by publishing for
comment a proposed rule stating that the Indian preference
would apply only to positions within the Bureau of Indian
Affairs and those that were transferred intact to another office in
the agency - but the agency never followed through with this
process. Consequently, the agency has, in essence, simply
adopted Solicitor Tarr's 1988 ex parte memorandum and then
posted employment notices, which is exactly what the D.C.
Circuit forewarned against. Having elected not to follow
through with the published rulemaking process, and there being
no new events to otherwise explain the departure from prior
interpretations of the term "Indian Office," the Court is
persuaded that the agency has failed to demonstrate a "reasoned"
analysis for its change in course.145
Technically, the Indian Educators Federation achieved a partial victory
because the position and conduct of the DOI was declared unlawful.'46 The
court was revisiting an issue against which the D.C. Circuit Court
forewarned 17 years before, and one which the agency could have easily
settled by following through with its abortive start to a rulemaking. And
yet, despite its disapproval of the DOI's actions (or lack thereof), the court
denied the Federation's request for a permanent injunction.14 7  With a
history so favorable to the defendants, the failure to achieve a verdict with
any enforcement value could discourage any other prospective plaintiffs.
Overall, even when a plaintiff wins a case, the process requires
(1) exhausting agency appeals procedures, (2) filing suit, (3) prevailing in
court, and (4) waiting for the agency to take corrective action. If the new
agency action is not in line with the law's requirements, the plaintiff then
143. Id. at 265 n.5.
144. Id. at 258-59.
145. Id. at 265 n.5.
146. Id. at 267.
147. Kempthorne II, 590 F. Supp. 2d 15, 21 (D.D.C. 2008).
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begins again with the process of exhausting agency appeals. Because
courts have failed to enforce Indian preference laws in the past, agencies
have very little incentive to comply with statutory requirements, and
plaintiffs have very little incentive to bring suit. In light of the Supreme
Court's recent hostility toward Indian law issues,148 there is also little
chance of higher judicial intervention prompting a change in course.
D. Blood Quantum Laws Create Constitutional Conflict
Indian preference is at risk because it may constitute unconstitutional
racial discrimination. Currently, it is not defined as "invidious racial
discrimination," 49 but this is only because the Supreme Court's holding in
Morton v. Mancari established that the preference is granted to "quasi-
sovereign tribal entitiesso rather than a "discrete racial group."'' Mancari
began in 1972 when the Commissioner of Indian Affairs issued a directive
that the "BIA's policy would be to grant a preference to qualified Indians
not only, as before, in the initial hiring stage, but also in the situation where
an Indian and a non-Indian, both already employed by the BIA, were
competing for a promotion within the Bureau."1s2 Objecting to this change
in policy, non-Indian employees of the BIA brought a class action
lawsuit.'5 3 The plaintiffs claimed that this policy deprived them of property
148. See, e.g., Matthew L.M. Fletcher, The Supreme Court and Federal Indian Policy, 85
NEB. L. REV. 121, 127-28 (2006) ("Until the 1977 case of Delaware Tribal Business
Committee v. Weeks, the Supreme Court treated Indian cases with a soft touch, preferring to
leave the policy choices to Congress and the Executive, often invoking the political-question
doctrine in refusing to review the constitutionality of Indian legislation. But the explicit
rejection of the political-question doctrine in Weeks was a signal of a parallel phenomenon -
the increasing tendency of the Court to make policy in the field of federal Indian law. The
Court's entrance into the field of federal Indian policy is unwelcome, largely because the
Court's policy choices are frequently uneducated in terms of their on-the-ground impacts,
but also because they are in direct contravention of explicit congressional and Executive
Branch policy choices.") (footnotes omitted); Marcia Coyle, Indians Try to Keep Cases
Away from High Court, NAT'L LAW J. (Mar. 29, 2010), available at http://turtletalk.files.
wordpress.com/2010/03/indians-try-to-keep-cases-away-from-high-court.pdf ("We view this
Court as not favorable on our issues. . . . [W]e are all batting zero.") (quoting Richard
Guest, senior staff attorney at the Native American Rights Fund).
149. Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 552-54 (1974).
150. Id. at 554.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 538.
153. Id. at 538-39.
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rights in employment by denying them an equal opportunity, and therefore,
that it violated the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. 154
The Mancari Court unanimously held that there was no constitutional
conflict.' The Court's analysis first examined the effect on other statutes:
Literally every piece of legislation dealing with Indian tribes and
reservations, and certainly all legislation dealing with the BIA,
single out for special treatment a constituency of tribal Indians
living on or near reservations. If these laws, derived from
historical relationships and explicitly designed to help only
Indians, were deemed invidious racial discrimination, an entire
Title of the United States Code (25 U.S.C.) would be effectively
erased and the solemn commitment of the Government toward
the Indians would be jeopardized.156
The Court then turned its analysis to the claim of "racial discrimination."
The Court held there was no constitutional conflict because "the preference
is reasonably and directly related to a legitimate, nonracially based goal."' 57
The goal was "to further the cause of Indian self-government and to make
the BIA more responsive to the needs of its constituent groups."'s This
principle was recently applied again, when a court held that a non-Indian
did not have a claim for racial discrimination when Indian preference was
applied. '
154. Id. at 537, 539. Also at issue in the suit was whether the Equal Employment
Opportunities Act of 1972 (EEO Act), prohibiting racial discrimination in federal
employment, had repealed by implication the Indian preference statutes. Id. at 539. Title 42
U.S.C. §§ 2000e-16(a) reads: "All personnel actions affecting employees or applicants for
employment. . . in executive agencies ... shall be made free from any discrimination based
on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-16(a) (2006). A
unanimous Court held that the EEO Act did not impliedly repeal the Indian preference laws.
See Mancari, 417 U.S. at 545-47 (noting that Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 made
specific exemptions for Indian tribes and employers on or near a reservation in 42 U.S.C. §§
2000e(b), 2000e-2(i), revealing "a clear congressional sentiment that an Indian preference in
the narrow context of tribal or reservation-related employment did not constitute racial
discrimination of the type otherwise proscribed"); Mancari, 417 U,S. at 550 ("A provision
aimed at furthering Indian self-government by according an employment preference within
the BIA for qualified members of the governed group can readily co-exist with a general rule
prohibiting employment discrimination on the basis of race.").
155. Mancari, 417 U.S. at 554-55.
156. Id. at 552.
157. Id. at 554.
158. Id.




The constitutional threat to Indian preference arises when one looks
beyond the word "Indian" to see how it is defined in statutes and federal
regulations. Despite the Mancari analysis, legally, it is as much a racial
classification as a political one. With the IRA's passage in 1934, tribes
received sovereign authority over who were members of their tribes, based
on blood, group affiliation and participation, residence, or any other factors.
And yet, the federal government reserved the right to determine Indian
status by blood alone:
The IRA also was an important crossroads for tribal
membership. The Bureau of Indian Affairs' legal interpretation
of the act recognized the inherent sovereignty of tribes to define
their own membership. . . . However, definitions of Indian
eligibility for federal programs, and the choice to use blood
quantum or not, would remain within the authority of the federal
government. 160
The BIA has heavily race-based qualification requirements. 6 1  The
BIA's form for verification of Indian preference qualification sets out four
categories that make one an "Indian" subject to preference.16 2 The first two
address nation affiliation, requiring membership in a federally recognized
tribe or descent from a member of a federally recognized tribe.163 But the
third option allows for qualification based solely on race and includes
"[p]ersons who possess at least one-half degree Indian blood derived from
tribes indigenous to the United States."'"' Blood quantum is also the
standard set out in the Code of Federal Regulations.'s The end result is a
remarkable degree of confusion about the definition of "Indian":
The Census, for example, takes one approach; it allows
individuals to self-identify as Indian by checking the racial
category "Native American/Alaska Native." Other laws are
more restrictive, requiring membership in a federally recognized
Indian tribe, "Indian descent," one-half or one-quarter Indian
160. Paul Spruhan, A Legal History of Blood Quantum in Federal Indian Law to 1935,
51 S.D. L. REv. 1, 47 (2006) (footnotes omitted) [hereinafter Spruhan, Blood Quantum].
161. See BUREAU OF INDIAN AFFAIRS, FORM BIA-4432, OMB CONTROL No. 1076-0160





165. See 25 C.F.R. § 5.1 (2010).
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blood, and/or residence on a reservation. This definitional
landscape is further complicated by the fact that these criteria
often conflict with tribal membership provisions. The untenable
result of this situation is that an individual may be an "Indian"
for the purpose of receiving educational grants but not health
benefits. Or, he may be. eligible to be chief of his tribe but yet
not an "Indian" for the purposes of obtaining a Bureau of Indian
Affairs (BIA) loan or an Indian scholarship to a state
university. 66
The oft-cited Mancari decision,167 on which much of Indian preference's
support rests, is undercut by the racial methods of qualification for
inclusion. The Court specifically built its reasoning for the lack of a
constitutional conflict on the requirement that an Indian be a member of a
federally recognized tribe: "The preference is not directed towards a 'racial'
group consisting of 'Indians'; instead, it applies only to members of
'federally recognized' tribes." 68
Moreover, because of the emphasis on "Indian" status rather than tribal
affiliation, preference is applied in practice as though it is based on race. 69
If a federal Indian preference position opens up that serves the Navajo on or
near their lands, any Indian, whether Yaqui, Cherokee, or Navajo, would be
equally preferred. If, in practice, Indian preference were based on
membership in a quasi-sovereign tribal entity,o70 then federal jobs
geographically located on or near a particular tribe's land, with functions
that serve that particular tribe, would give preference first to members of
166. Brownell, supra note 13, at 276-77 (footnotes omitted).
167. See generally Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535 (1974).
168. Id. at 554 n.24.
169. The scope of this comment is limited to federal application of preference within the
DOI. The individual tribes are free to (and frequently do) set their own preference laws.
See, e.g., Employment Practices, NAVAJO NATION DEP'T OF PERS. MGMT., http://www.dpm.
navajo-nsn.gov/ppm seciii.html (last visited Apr. 23, 2012) ("The Navajo Nation gives
preference in employment to enrolled members of the Navajo Tribe in accordance with the
provisions of the Navajo Preference in Employment Act (15 N.N.C. §601 - §619) [sic].").
Among the tribal preference laws, many include provisions for preference first to members
of their own tribes, second to any Indian, and finally to qualified applicants of any other
race. See, e.g., Chad Smith, Principal Chief of Cherokee Nation, Exec. Order No. 12-1 0-CS,
2-3 (Feb. 8, 2010), available at http://www.cherokee.org/Docs/News/2010/2/executive_
order.pdf ("[T]he Nation and its entities shall observe the following preferences: i. give
preference to Indians in hiring, promotion and training of employees as follows: 1. primary
preference to Cherokee citizens; and 2. second preference to other Indians.").
170. See Mancari, 417 U.S. at 554.
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the tribe served, rather than to all Indians. As a result, the practical
applications of Indian preference appear to be contrary to the rationales that
allow it to exist: "Indian" being a political classification based on tribal
affiliation, local self-governance,' 7 ' and the general self-governance
principlesl 7 2 offered as the goal of Indian preference. If Indian preference
survives constitutional scrutiny only through being a political affiliation, the
racial requirements for membership in the class and the tribe-blind
applications of it are significant unresolved problems.173
The Secretary of the Interior noted this problem, and strongly argued that
applying preference outside the BIA would be constitutionally
unacceptable.174 But it is unclear why preference is any better inside the
BIA. It is possible that another concerted attack on Indian preference on
these grounds could be successful,77 especially in the face of a Court
seemingly less supportive of Indian concerns.'76
IV Proposal: Avenues to Save Indian Preference
This comment proposes two main avenues through which to save Indian
preference and foster tribal self-governance. First, race should be removed
from the definition of "Indian" for the purpose of Indian preference, with
171. 78 CONG. REC. 11,729 (1934) (remarks of Congressman Howard) ("The Indians
have not only been thus deprived of civic rights and powers, but they have been largely
deprived of the opportunity to enter the more important positions in the service of the very
bureau which manages their affairs. Theoretically, the Indians have the right to qualify for
the Federal civil service. In actual practice there has been no adequate program of training
to qualify Indians to compete in these examinations, especially for technical and higher
positions; and even if there were such training, the Indians would have to compete under
existing law, on equal terms with multitudes of white applicants. . . . The various services
on the Indian reservations are actually local rather than Federal services and are comparable
to local municipal and county services, since they are dealing with purely local Indian
problems. It should be possible for Indians with the requisite vocational and professional
training to enter the service of their own people without the necessity of competing with
white applicants for these positions. This bill permits them to do so.").
172. See Mancari, 417 U.S. at 541-42.
173. For a detailed discussion of these blood quantum constitutional issues, see Spruhan,
Indian as Race /Indian as Political Status, supra note 71.
174. Reply Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Motion to Dismiss or, in the
Alternative, for Summary Judgment at 7, Indian Educators Fed'n Local 4525 v.
Kempthorne, 541 F. Supp. 2d 257 (D.D.C. 2008) (Civil No. 04-01215 (TFH)).
175. For a detailed treatment of these issues, including a discussion of the effect of the
Rice v. Cayetano case, see Rose Cuison Villazor, Blood Quantum Land Laws and the Race
Versus Political Identity Dilemma, 96 CAUF. L. REv. 801 (2008).
176. See, e.g., Coyle, supra note 148.
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the focus shifted to tribal affiliation. Second, the DOI or Congress should
clarify, in an unambiguous way, precisely which positions are subject to
preference.
To resolve the constitutional issues, one possible solution is to remove
the blood quantum aspects from the definition of "Indian.""'7  This course
of action raises concerns about genetic Indians who, for a myriad of
reasons, may not be included on the tribal rolls of a federally recognized
tribe.'7 ' The reasons for exclusion have roots in historical accident and
modern political and economic pressures. Tribal politics place a greater
premium on tribal membership and create incentives to reduce the number
of tribal members.' 79 The desire for a greater share of casino profits led to
purging of membership rolls in multiple tribes.so If one is not already a
recognized tribal member, the federal requirement for individual
genealogical research and proof is often impossible to satisfy.' 8' Finally,
when the original Dawes Act rolls 82 were compiled, many Indians were
mistrustful of the process and refused to participate,' thereby excluding
them from what became the official list of Indians at the end of the
nineteenth century.' 84
177. Spruhan, Indian as Race /Indian as Political Status, supra note 71, at 28 ("Based
on such concerns, some commentators advocate refining definitions of 'Indian' in federal
law to eliminate blood quantum requirements, therefore avoiding the possibility that the
unique treatment of Indians and Indian tribes be declared invalid as invidious racial
discrimination.").
178. See, e.g., Brownell, supra note 13.
179. See, e.g., Suzianne D. Painter-Thorne, If You Build It, They Will Come: Preserving
Tribal Sovereignty In The Face Of Indian Casinos and The New Premium on Tribal
Membership, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REv. 311, 320-27 (2010).
180. See, e.g., id. at 311 ("Some argue that the new wealth brought by casinos has
increased fights over membership as tribes seek to expel current members or refuse to admit
new members."); Tina Lamb, Fight for Justice: On the Keweenaw Bay Indian Community
Reservation, DETROIT FREE PRESs (Mar. 22, 1996), available at http://baragarose.tripod.
com/free-press.htm (noting that the Keweenaw Bay tribe purged 200 members from the
rolls, allegedly to shift the outcome of a key vote in a casino money dispute).
181. See generally U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, GUIDE TO TRACING YOUR AMERICAN
INDIAN ANCESTRY (n.d.), available at http://www.bia.gov/idc/groups/public/documents/text/
idc002656.pdf.
182. General Allotment Act of 1887 (Dawes Act), ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388, 388-91 (1887)
(codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 331-358 (2006)).
183. The mistrust was hardly surprising, as one of the proponents of the plan was
Commissioner of Indian Affairs Hiram Price, who supported the allotment system with the
avowed goal "to domesticate and civilize wild Indians." COMMISSIONER OF INDIAN AFFAIRS,
ANNUAL REPORT FOR 1881, at III (188 1).




Despite the many possibilities for exclusion, the tribe, as a sovereign
nation, is the proper body to define its membership.' 85  Tribal self-
governance, as a value and a policy goal behind Indian preference laws,
depends on the existence of a nation to self-govern. Once tribal members
have left the national group and are no longer active participants, the
rationale for giving them employment preference no longer stands.'16 If the
choices are between an outcome where Indian preference on the whole
cannot survive or limiting its scope to members of recognized tribes, the
latter is preferable.
While addressing the constitutional concerns, it also might be prudent to
change the scope of preference qualification for some positions based on
specific tribal affiliation, rather than general membership in any tribe. If a
BIA job is on the Navajo reservation and provides services to Navajos
exclusively, giving equal preference to Yaquis and Navajos makes the
preference a racial (rather than sovereign-national) one. Instead, the DOI
could evaluate jobs to determine whether employees are providing services
to multiple tribes, in which case all Indians would qualify for preference, or
whether that position provides services exclusively to one tribe, in which
case the preference would be tribe-specific. This may resolve the
"invidious racial discrimination" issues otherwise implicated.
In addition, there are two primary avenues through which to clarify the
scope of "Indian Office." The DOI could elect to hold a proper "notice and
comment" rulemaking, as advocated by the D.C. Circuit. Doing so would
allow it to support its 1988 interpretive changes, or perhaps allow it to
redirect its position again, as influenced by the new administration.
President Obama appointed new heads of both the DOI (Ken Salazar)'8 7
and the BIA (Larry EchoHawk),188 making a decisive course-correction
possible. Alternately, Congress could amend the statute again, providing a
185. Spruhan, Blood Quantum, supra note 160, at 47 ("The Bureau of Indian Affairs'
legal interpretation of the [1934 Indian Reorganization] act recognized the inherent
sovereignty of tribes to define their own membership.").
186. See, e.g., Painter-Thorne, supra note 179, at 339 ("Blood Quantum & DNA Are Bad
Proxies for Culture.").
187. Obama appointed a "liberal democrat," Ken Salazar, to head the DOI. See, e.g., Ken
Salazar, N.Y. TIMES, http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/people/s/ken_sala
zar/index.html?scp=1-spot&sq=ken%20salazar&st=cse (last updated June 21, 2010).
188. With a Native American in the highest position within the agency, one can hope for
a more Indian-supportive leadership of the BIA. See, e.g., Kevin Richert, EchoHawk's
Return to the Public Policy Arena, VOICES.IDAHOSTATESMEN.COM (Apr. 13, 2009), http://
voices.idahostatesman.com/2009/04/13/krichert/echohawks-retum_publicpolicyarena.
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more detailed definition of "Indian Office" that precludes agency
reorganization as a tool for avoiding preferential status for Indians.189
V Conclusion
Despite that Indian self-governance is an important policy goal of
Congress, Indian trust funds, education, land management, and many other
important issues are controlled by government agencies. Indian tribes are
sovereign nations, wholly located within the borders of the United States.
They do not have military might or the ability to enter into treaties with
other nations to enforce their rights. Instead, they rely on the government
to honor its promises and deliver on its obligations.
The IRA is one of those promises. The Act promises preference in
employment for positions that provide services to Indians and for positions
that administer their resources. For the last 20 years, the DOI imposed
limits on the scope of this self-governance. It is time for this to stop.
To preserve Indian preference and foster tribal self-governance, race
should be removed from the definition of "Indian," with the focus shifted to
tribal affiliation. In addition, the DOI or Congress should clarify precisely
which positions are subject to preference. These two steps will help to
protect Indian preference from further weakening by the DOI and the
courts. Indian preference remains viable and beneficial, and should be
preserved.
189. While Indian preference still applies to the Indian Health Service because it was
"removed intact" from the BIA, if the DOI creates a new department or moves individual
positions to other departments, those positions and departments will not be subject to the
same protections. In this way, agency reorganization can be used to limit the number of
positions to which preference applies.
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